This paper studies dynamic spectrum leasing in a cognitive radio network. There are two spectrum sellers, who are two primary networks, each with an amount of licensed spectrum bandwidth. When a seller has some unused spectrum, it would like to lease the unused spectrum to secondary users. A coordinator helps to perform the spectrum leasing stage-by-stage. As the two sellers may have different leasing periods, there are three epochs, in which seller 1 has spectrum to lease in Epochs II and III, while seller 2 has spectrum to lease in Epochs I and II. Each seller needs to decide how much spectrum it should lease to secondary users in each stage of its leasing period, with a target at revenue maximization. It is shown that, when the two sellers both have spectrum to lease (i.e., in Epoch II), the spectrum leasing can be formulated as a noncooperative game. Nash equilibria of the game are found in closed form. Solutions of the two sellers in their leasing periods are then derived.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OGNITIVE radio has been considered as a promising solution to the spectrum shortage problem in the near future. In cognitive radio, spectrum access of unlicensed users (referred to as secondary users), which is required not to affect the communication of licensed users (referred to as primary users), is permitted [1] . To implement cognitive radio, two typical modes are overlay mode and underlay mode. In overlay mode, spectrum access of secondary users is permitted only when primary users are idle. Thus, secondary users are required to perform periodical spectrum sensing to detect possible transmissions of primary users. In underlay mode, secondary users can access the spectrum when primary users are transmitting. Secondary users should carefully manage their transmit power such that their Manuscript generated interference to primary users is below a threshold limit.
It is difficult to guarantee quality-of-service (QoS) of secondary users in overlay or underlay mode. In overlay mode, secondary users have to wait until primary users do not have traffic to transmit. If primary users have high traffic load, secondary users would have little chance to transmit. In underlay mode, due to the transmit power constraint, secondary users may only achieve short-range low-rate communications.
To better serve secondary users, spectrum leasing has been introduced, in which if a primary user (also called spectrum seller) has some unused spectrum for a certain amount of time, it leases the unused spectrum to secondary users. During the leasing period, the secondary users can use the spectrum exclusively, which guarantees their communication QoS. Furthermore, the leasing revenue can motivate the spectrum seller to use its spectrum more efficiently so as to collect more unused spectrum for leasing. Optimal spectrum leasing that maximizes the spectrum seller's revenue is an interesting topic, which is also the focus of this paper.
In the literature, spectrum leasing has been well investigated under the modes of monopoly spectrum leasing (in which there is one spectrum seller) and oligopoly spectrum leasing (in which multiple spectrum sellers exist). In monopoly spectrum leasing, e.g., the works in [2] - [4] , the major target is to achieve the maximal revenue of the seller. In oligopoly spectrum leasing, e.g., the works in [5] - [12] , the major target is to achieve an equilibrium in the competition among multiple spectrum sellers. In these works, spectrum leasing is performed only once, and the spectrum price is fixed for the whole spectrum leasing duration, referred to as static spectrum leasing. On the other hand, dynamic spectrum leasing, in which the spectrum price may change over time, is more appropriate for the cases that the secondary users may need spectrum at different time instants. There are limited research efforts in the literature on dynamic spectrum leasing, including the works in [13] - [15] that consider a single spectrum seller and the work in [16] that considers multiple spectrum sellers.
In this paper, we study dynamic spectrum leasing problem in a duopoly market with two sellers. 1 As the two sellers may have different leasing periods, the system has three epochs, in which seller 1 has spectrum to lease in Epochs II and III, while seller 2 has spectrum to lease in Epochs I and II. The main contributions in this paper are summarized as follows. 1) We show that, the spectrum leasing problems of the sellers in Epoch I and Epoch III are convex optimization problems. For Epoch II, we formulate spectrum leasing of the two sellers as a non-cooperative game. We derive closed-form expressions for the Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative game. 2) The amount of spectrum that seller 1 would like to lease in Epoch III affects the non-cooperative game in Epoch II, and thus, affects the total revenues of the two sellers. By analyzing properties of seller 1's revenue in Epoch II and Epoch III, we propose a method that finds the optimal amount of spectrum that seller 1 should lease to secondary users in Epoch III.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, related works are reviewed. In Section III, the system model is presented, and the spectrum leasing problems for the two sellers are formulated. In Section IV, Nash equilibria of the noncooperative game in Epoch II are derived. Section V discusses how seller 1 should distribute its spectrum to be leased in Epoch II and Epoch III. Numerical results are given in Section VI, and finally the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Monopoly spectrum leasing: In the work of [2] , there are a spectrum provider, a broker, and a number of secondary users. By a Stackelberg game modeling, the broker optimally decides on the number of channels it should purchase from the spectrum provider as well as the price it should use to sell the purchased spectrum to secondary users. The work in [3] also considers a broker. It is assumed that for a given spectrum price, the amount of spectrum demand from secondary users is random. The work in [4] considers the impact of spectrum leasing on primary user performance (such as possible extra interference to the primary system). An optimal solution is given for the primary user, which strikes a balance between the earned revenue and the cost.
Oligopoly spectrum leasing: Two brokers are assumed in [5] . Each broker decides on the amount of spectrum that it should purchase from spectrum providers and on the spectrum price that it should announce to secondary users, with a target at profit maximization. The work in [6] also considers two brokers, by assuming that the leased spectrum may be shared by multiple secondary users simultaneously. Therefore, interference among secondary users needs to be taken into account. The works in [7] - [9] consider a duopoly market, in which the price competition of two spectrum sellers is investigated by using game theoretical approaches. The work in [10] discusses the case with multiple sellers. By using an evolutionary game model, a solution is given to secondary users for their spectrum selection and to sellers for price setting. The work in [11] considers multiple sellers as well as one broker, in which the impact of spectrum leasing on sellers' performance (i.e., service quality degradation) is taken into account. The work in [12] considers heterogeneous secondary users, i.e., different secondary users may have different criteria on their spectrum leasing decisions.
Note that in all above works on monopoly and oligopoly spectrum leasing, the spectrum price is fixed for the whole spectrum leasing duration, and thus, the works all consider static spectrum leasing.
Dynamic pricing: In [13] , dynamic pricing in monopoly spectrum leasing is performed over infinite time horizon. The spectrum price is set dynamically, with a target at long-term average revenue maximization. In [14] , dynamic pricing in monopoly spectrum leasing is performed over a finite duration. The finite duration is divided into a number of stages, and the price in each stage is set up so as to maximize the overall revenue. In [15] , dynamic spectrum leasing is investigated for a monopoly market. Among all channels, some are allocated as leased channels, and the others are called unleased channels. Secondary users can access the leased channels (with higher priority if primary users are also allowed to access), as well as the unleased channels with a lower priority than that of primary users. The number of leased channels is adjusted following the arrival/departure events of the primary and secondary users. In [16] , dynamic spectrum leasing is investigated, considering the competition among multiple spectrum sellers. A stochastic Cournot game model is used to derive the leasing strategies (i.e., the amount of spectrum to lease) of the spectrum sellers.
In this paper, we also consider dynamic spectrum leasing. The difference of our work from those in [13] - [15] lies in that the works in [13] - [15] consider a monopoly market while we consider a duopoly market. The difference of our work from that in [16] is as follows. In [16] , each spectrum seller's available spectrum for leasing is determined by the market (in other words, the spectrum seller sets the amount of spectrum that it could lease so as to maximize its profit). In our work, each spectrum seller's available spectrum is determined by traffic load of its own users. After all its users' traffic has been accommodated, the unused spectrum can be leased to secondary users.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider two spectrum sellers (seller 1 and seller 2), one coordinator, and multiple secondary users. Similar to [15] , the coordinator is a centralized unit (e.g., a base station controller) which is trusted by the spectrum sellers and secondary users. It is responsible to collect information (for example, amount of spectrum to lease) from and get back to spectrum sellers, post spectrum price to secondary users, lease spectrum to secondary users, manage secondary users' access to the leased spectrum, etc. The two sellers are primary networks with a certain amount of licensed spectrum bandwidth. For each seller, when the data traffic from its own users is light, the seller may partition its spectrum bandwidth into two portions: primary portion and secondary portion. The primary portion will be assigned to the seller's own users, and the secondary portion can be leased to secondary users. In specific, consider that seller 1 and seller 2 have bandwidth Q 1 and Q 2 in their secondary portion, respectively. For each seller, the bandwidth in its secondary portion can be leased to secondary users for a duration (called leasing period). Consider that the two sellers' leasing periods are not identical, 2 and overlap with each other. Without loss of generality, we assume that the leasing period of seller 2 starts earlier than the leasing period of seller 1. We also assume that the leasing period of seller 2 ends earlier than that of seller 1. 3 An illustration of the two leasing periods is given in Fig. 1 . Here the union of the two leasing periods contains N fixed-length stages. For presentation simplicity, the last stage of seller 1's leasing period is called stage 1, while the first stage of seller 2's leasing period is called stage N . Seller i (i = 1, 2) would distribute its spectrum bandwidth Q i to be leased in the stages of its leasing period. In other words, it needs to decide on the amount of spectrum bandwidth to be leased in each stage in its leasing period, with a constraint that the total amount of leased spectrum bandwidth in the stages is bounded by Q i . For seller i, denote the amount of spectrum bandwidth it would like to lease to secondary users in stage n as d n,i . At the beginning of stage n, seller i should report to the coordinator the information of d n,i .
At the beginning of stage n, after the coordinator gets the information of d n,1 and d n,2 , it would set up a spectrum unit price (the price per unit bandwidth per stage) and lease the spectrum bandwidth (d n,1 + d n,2 ) to secondary users. In other words, the coordinator should set up the unit price to attract (d n,1 + d n,2 ) spectrum bandwidth demand from secondary users. Denote the price p to attract d spectrum bandwidth demand as P (d), which is a function of d. Economics analysis [17] , [18] has shown that price and demand typically follow a linear model, and thus, price p and spectrum bandwidth demand d satisfy the following feature:
in which C 0 and C 1 are coefficients. 4 P (d) is a decreasing function of d. In addition, d · P (d) should be an increasing function of d (as the total revenue for more leased spectrum bandwidth should be higher), based on which we have
From Fig. 1 , the union of the two sellers' leasing periods can be divided into three epochs: In Epoch I, only seller 2 has spectrum to lease; in Epoch II, both sellers have spectrum to lease; and in Epoch III, only seller 1 has spectrum to lease. Denote the set of stages in Epoch I, II, and III as N I , N II , and N III , respectively. Denote the set of stages in the leasing period of seller 1 and seller 2 as N 1 and N 2 , respectively. Thus, we have N 1 = N II ∪ N III and N 2 = N I ∪ N II .
Seller i (i ∈ {1, 2}) aims at maximizing its total revenue over all the stages by deciding on d n,i , n ∈ N i . Next, the spectrum leasing problem in each epoch is discussed.
A. Spectrum Leasing Problem in Epoch I
In Epoch I, only seller 2 has spectrum to lease, and it does not know when seller 1 will join the spectrum leasing market and how much spectrum bandwidth seller 1 will offer for spectrum leasing. In other words, in Epoch I, seller 2 does not know when Epoch II will start. So seller 2 assumes a monopoly market in Epoch I. At a stage in Epoch I, once an amount of spectrum is leased to secondary users, the spectrum will be used by secondary users until the last stage of seller 2's leasing period. 5 For seller 2's spectrum leasing, it has the following two constraints for d n,2 :
Seller 2's collected revenue at stage n is (C 0 − C 1 d n,2 )d n,2 × (n − |N III |), in which | · | means cardinality of a set. To 5 The rationale for this setting is as follows. It is possible that a secondary user may finish its transmission before the last stage of seller 2's leasing period. The secondary user's actual transmission duration depends on the user's traffic load as well as its instantaneous channel quality during the transmission. However, when a secondary user decides to lease the spectrum, it is difficult to predict the instantaneous channel quality during future transmission over the spectrum, as the instantaneous channel quality may vary dynamically during future transmission. Thus, when a secondary user decides to lease the spectrum, it is unaware when its transmission will finish. Then, at the spectrum seller's side, when some spectrum is leased to a secondary user, the seller assumes that the leased spectrum will be used by the secondary user until the end of the seller's leasing period. If the secondary user finishes its transmission earlier, say at stage k, then the seller will take the leased spectrum back, update its spectrum stock, and re-run our proposed scheme at stage k. maximize its overall revenue, seller 2 should solve the following optimization problem: 6 Problem 1:
Problem 1 is a convex optimization problem, because 1) its objective function is a concave function with respect to the vector of variables {d n,2 |n ∈ N 2 }, and 2) its feasible region is a convex set. Thus, the global optimal solution of Problem 1 can be achieved by existing numerical optimization methods.
B. Spectrum Leasing Problem in Epoch II
At Epoch II's first stage (denoted as stage l), seller 1 has available spectrum bandwidth Q 1 , while we denote the remaining spectrum bandwidth of seller 2 as Q II 2 (in other words, spectrum bandwidth with amount (Q 2 − Q II 2 ) has been leased out by seller 2 in Epoch I). At the beginning of stage l, each seller does not know the presence of the other seller, and thus, assumes a monopoly spectrum leasing. So each seller reports to the coordinator the amount of spectrum bandwidth it would like to lease to secondary users in the stage. In specific, seller 1 has the following constraints for d n,1 :
So seller 1 solves the following convex optimization problem:
and reports to the coordinator the values of d l,1 (d l,1 is from the optimal solution of the above problem) and |N 1 | (the leasing duration for the d l,1 spectrum bandwidth). On the other hand, seller 2 has the following constraints for d n,2 :
6 In Epoch I, seller 2 does not know the value of |N III |. However, it knows the value of (n − |N III |) (the length from stage n until the end of seller 2's leasing period). Thus, in Problem 1, we use notation (n − |N III |), for consistence of the formulated spectrum leasing problems in the three epochs.
So seller 2 solves the following convex optimization problem:
and reports to the coordinator the values of d l,2 (d l,2 is from the optimal solution of the above problem) and (|N 2 | − |N I |) (which is the length of seller 2's remaining leasing period, and is mathematically equal to |N 2 \N I | or |N II |), in which |N I | stands for the length of preceding stages. Then the coordinator feeds back to the two sellers by telling 1) that now two sellers have spectrum to lease, 2) how much spectrum bandwidth each seller offers in this stage, and 3) how long the leasing period is for each seller. From d l,1 and |N 1 | in the feedback information, seller 2 can find out the available stock of seller 1, by searching the value of Q 1 (using bisection search) that makes d l,1 be in the optimal solution of the problem in (4). Similarly, seller 1 can also find out the available stock of seller 2. Based on stock information of the other seller, each seller adjusts the amount of offered spectrum bandwidth (d l,1 or d l,2 ) and resubmits to the coordinator, and the coordinator decides on a unit price based on (1) with total spectrum demand (d l,1 + d l,2 ). In each subsequent stage (say stage n) in Epoch II, by knowing the existence of the other seller, each seller reports to the coordinator the amount of offered spectrum bandwidth (d n,1 or d n,2 ), and the coordinator decides on a unit price based on (1) with total spectrum demand (d n,1 + d n,2 ).
In every stage in Epoch II, once an amount of spectrum bandwidth of a seller is leased to secondary users, the spectrum will be used by secondary users until the last stage of the corresponding seller's leasing period.
A decision that seller 1 should make in Epoch II is the amount Q III 1 of spectrum bandwidth it reserves for Epoch III, where
In other words, seller 1 would like to lease spectrum bandwidth (Q 1 − Q III 1 ) in Epoch II. In Epoch II, the announced unit price at each stage (say stage n) depends on the sum of d n,1 and d n,2 . Thus, there is a noncooperative game between the two sellers. In this game, the two players are seller 1 and seller 2, and the strategy of seller 1 and seller 2 are S 1 {d n,1 |n ∈ N II } and S 2 {d n,2 |n ∈ N II }, respectively. The payoff function of seller 1 and seller 2 can be expressed as
respectively. Define the feasible region of seller 1's strategy as
which can be written as a simple form
when seller 1 would like to lease to secondary users spectrum bandwidth amount y in Epoch II, and define the feasible region of seller 2's strategy as
when seller 2 would like to lease to secondary users spectrum bandwidth amount z in Epoch II. The objective of seller 1 is to solve the following optimization problem Problem 2:
and the objective of seller 2 is to solve the following optimization problem Problem 3:
For the non-cooperative game of the two sellers, a Nash equilibrium defines a strategy pair (S 1 , S 2 ) that a seller cannot earn more revenue by deviating from its strategy while keeping the other seller's strategy unchanged. In other words, a Nash equilibrium should be a joint optimal solution of Problems 2 and 3.
C. Spectrum Leasing Problem in Epoch III
In Epoch III, only seller 1 is active in the spectrum market, and thus, monopoly spectrum leasing is performed. Once an amount of spectrum bandwidth is leased to secondary users, the spectrum will be used by secondary users until the end of Epoch III. Seller 1 has the following constraints for d n,1 in its spectrum leasing in Epoch III:
To maximize its revenue in Epoch III, seller 1 solves the following optimization problem. Problem 4:
Similar to Problem 1, Problem 4 is also a convex optimization problem, and thus, can be solved by existing numerical optimization methods.
D. Overall Leasing Strategy of the Sellers
In Epoch I, since seller 2 does not know when Epoch II will start, it assumes a monopoly market, and solves Problem 1 to get its leasing strategy in Epoch I.
At the beginning of Epoch II, some of seller 2's spectrum has been leased to secondary users in preceding stages. In other words, seller 2 could not "go back" to revise its leasing strategy in Epoch I. Thus, seller 2's leasing strategy decision for Epoch II is separate from that in Epoch I. In specific, in Epoch II, seller 2 follows a Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game.
For seller 1 at the beginning of Epoch II, it knows that both sellers will be present in Epoch II and it will be the only seller in Epoch III. Thus, seller 1 can use the amount of spectrum it reserves for Epoch III, i.e., Q III 1 , as an input for Epoch II's non-cooperative game, and find the optimal value of Q III 1 that maximizes its overall revenue. Thus, seller 1's leasing strategies in Epoch II and III are jointly determined, as follows.
From the perspective of seller 1, it can adjust Q III 1 . For a specific Q III 1 , the two sellers need to follow a Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative game in Epoch II. Thus, the strategy of seller 1 can be written as Q III 1 and S 1 , while the strategy of seller 2 can be written as S 2 .
When seller 1 reserves spectrum bandwidth Q III 1 for Epoch III, it means that seller 1 would like to lease spectrum bandwidth (Q 1 − Q III 1 ) in Epoch II. Accordingly, we denote the revenue of seller 1 in Epoch II as U (Q 1 − Q III 1 ), a function of (Q 1 − Q III 1 ). Then for seller 1 to maximize its overall revenue, the following optimization problem should be solved Problem 5:
is defined in (8) . In the following, in Section IV we find out Nash equilibria in Epoch II for a specific Q III 1 , and in Section V we select the optimal value of Q III 1 for seller 1.
A. Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in the Noncooperative Game in Epoch II
Recall that a Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II should be a joint optimal solution of Problems 2 and 3. Since the objective functions of Problems 2 and 3 are continuous and concave, and the feasible regions of the two sellers' strategies are convex, closed, bounded, and uncoupled 7 , there exists at least one Nash equilibrium point for the noncooperative game in Epoch II according to [19, Th. 1] .
For uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: When |N III | ≤ 12, there is only one Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative game in Epoch II.
Proof: Define the vectorized strategy of seller 1 and seller 2 in Epoch II as
The payoff function of seller 1 and seller 2 can be rewritten as
Then the pseudo-gradient of σ(x) can be given as
where 
is the Jacobian matrix of k(x) with respect to x. After some math manipulation, the matrix L(x) can be written as the following form
where L 11 
Here Diag(· · ·) means a diagonal matrix with all diagonal elements listed in (· · ·). The matrix L(x) can be guaranteed to be positive definite, if the leading principal minors are all positive [20] , i.e., the determinant of m × m upper-left submatrix of L(x) is larger than 0 for m = 1, 2, . . . , 2|N II |. Since there is
when matrix A is invertible [21] , the determinant of m × m upper-left submatrix of L(x) is larger than 0 for m = 1, 2, . . . , 2|N II | when the following inequalities hold
i.e., when
The inequalities in (14) hold if
This completes the proof. From the proof, it can be seen that the derivation of value 12 largely depends on the fact that there are two sellers in the spectrum market.
As the number of stages in Epoch III is normally limited, it is very likely that the value of |N III | is bounded by 12, and thus, Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II is unique. Nevertheless, in next subsection, we show how to find Nash equilibria in the non-cooperative game in Epoch II without constraint |N III | ≤ 12 (i.e., Nash equilibrium may or may not be unique).
B. Finding Nash Equilibria in the Noncooperative Game in Epoch II
As aforementioned, a Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game in Epoch II is a joint optimal solution of Problems 2 and 3. As both Problems 2 and 3 are convex problems and satisfy the Slater's condition, KKT condition is a sufficient and necessary condition for optimal solution for each problem [22] - [24] .
For the ease of presentation, we denote Q II c 1 = Q 1 − Q III 1 as the spectrum bandwidth amount that seller 1 would like to lease to secondary users in Epoch II. For Problem 2, the KKT condition is
where λ and μ n are Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints n ∈N II d n,1 ≤ Q II c 1 and d n,1 ≥ 0, respectively. For Problem 3, the KKT condition is
where ζ and ν n are Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints n ∈N II d n,2 ≤ Q II 2 and d n,2 ≥ 0, respectively.
To get Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II, (16) and (17) should be solved jointly.
We have two properties for the joint optimal solution:
r r Property 2: If d n,1 > 0 (n ∈ N II ), then we have μ n = 0;
if d n,2 > 0, then we have ν n = 0. Property 1 is due to the facts that the objective function of Problem 2 is a monotonically increasing function of d n,1 (n ∈ N II ) and that the objective function of Problem 3 is a monotonically increasing function of d n,2 (n ∈ N II ). Property 2 can be obtained directly from the equalities (16c) and (17c).
Next, we try to find the expressions of d n,1 and d n,2 by solving (16) and (17) .
From the equalities (16a) and (17a), d n,1 and d n,2 for n ∈ N II can be expressed as
from which we have
Define Z 1 = {n|d n,1 > 0, d n,2 > 0, n∈N II }, Z 2 = {n|d n,1 > 0, d n,2 = 0, n ∈ N II }, Z 3 = {n|d n,1 = 0, d n,2 > 0, n ∈ N II } and Z 4 = {n|d n,1 = 0, d n,2 = 0, n ∈ N II }. Then {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 } constitutes a decomposition of the set N II , which means that Z 1 Z 2 Z 3 Z 4 = N II and Z i Z j = ∅ (∅ being a null set) for i = j and i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Totally there are 2 2|N II | decompositions.
Next we find out the expressions of d n,1 and d n,2 for a specific decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 }.
From Property 1, we have
In the two equations, substituting the expressions of d n,1 and d n,2 in (20) and (21) for n ∈ Z 1 , substituting the expressions of d n,1 and d n,2 in (18) and (19) for n ∈ Z 2 and n ∈ Z 3 , and using Property 2, we have the following equations:
where
. (26) Note that A 11 , A 12 , A 21 and A 22 are all nonnegative. According to the equations in (22) , the Lagrange multipliers λ and ζ can be expressed as
With the aid of Property 2 and using (18)-(21), the closedform expressions of d n,1 and d n,2 for n ∈ N II are given as follows:
where λ and ζ are given in (27) and (28), respectively. By now, given the decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 }, expressions of d n,1 and d n,2 for n ∈ N II are derived. To guarantee that every equality or inequality in (16) and (17) is satisfied, a feasibility check is further required, which is given as follows:
1) λ and ζ, which can be calculated from (27) and (28), are non-negative. 2) d n,1 and d n,2 , which are calculated from (29) and (30), are non-negative for n ∈ N II . 3) μ n and ν n , which can be calculated from (18) and (19) given the obtained d n,1 , d n,2 , λ and ζ, are non-negative for n ∈ N II . If the above feasibility check passes, the decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 } is said to be feasible, and the derived d n,1 and d n,2 expressions in (29) and (30) for n ∈ N II given the decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 } form a Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II.
For the set N II , there are 2 2|N II | possible decompositions. To find all Nash equilibria of the game in Epoch II, an exhaustive search of all 2 2|N II | decompositions is required. As the number of stages in Epoch II is normally very limited, and the calculations in checking feasibility of each decomposition are simple, an exhaustive search of all 2 2|N II | decompositions is considered to be acceptable. In addition, the following theorem is helpful in reducing the complexity in the exhaustive search.
Theorem 2: For a feasible decomposition, if there exists a stage (say stage n) in Z 4 (i.e., d n,1 = d n,2 = 0), then all stages with a lower index in Epoch II should belong to Z 4 .
Proof: We use proof by contradiction. In the Nash equilibrium of the decomposition, suppose there is n † satisfying n † < n, n † ∈ N II \Z 4 . We first assume that n † ∈ Z 2 , which indicates that d n †,1 > 0, d n †,2 = 0. Then the total revenue collected over stage n and stage n † by seller 1 is (C 0 − C 1 d n †,1 ) × d n †,1 n †. By interchanging seller 1's offered spectrum bandwidth amounts in stage n and stage n †, the total revenue that seller 1 collects in stages n and n † becomes (C 0 − C 1 d n †,1 ) d n †,1 n, which is larger than (C 0 − C 1 d n †,1 ) d n †,1 n † since n † < n. This contradicts the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, n † ∈ Z 1 or n † ∈ Z 3 also leads to a contradiction. This completes the proof. Remark: Theorem 2 shows that in a feasible decomposition, if Z 4 is not empty, then it contains consecutive stages until the end of Epoch II. Therefore, in the exhaustive search of all possible decompositions, we can skip those decompositions in which Z 4 contains non-consecutive stages or does not last until the end of Epoch II. Thus, the number of decompositions that we should check reduces from 2 2|N II | to |N II | i=0 3 i . The term |N II | i=0 3 i is calculated as follows. We only need to check decompositions in which Z 4 contains consecutive stages until the end of Epoch II. When Z 4 contains the last i (i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , |N II |}) stages in Epoch II, there are 3 |N II |−i decompositions since each of the first (|N II | − i) stages in Epoch II can be in Z 1 , Z 2 , or Z 3 . Thus, the number of decompositions that we should check is
So far all Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II have been found. If there exists only one unique Nash equilibrium (e.g., when |N III | ≤ 12), then both sellers follow the unique Nash equilibrium. If there are two or more Nash equilibria, the two sellers need to select one Nash equilibrium to follow. Here the two sellers agree to follow the max-min Nash equilibrium, defined as the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the minimum unit-bandwidth revenue of the two sellers. Here for seller 1, its unit-bandwidth revenue is the ratio of its total revenue in Epoch II to Q II c 1 ; for seller 2, its unit-bandwidth revenue is the ratio of its total revenue in Epoch II to Q II 2 .
V. TOTAL REVENUE MAXIMIZATION FOR SELLER 1
In the previous section, we have found the strategies of the two sellers in Epoch II with a specific Q III 1 (the bandwidth that seller 1 reserves for Epoch III). Now, we try to solve Problem 5, i.e., find out the optimal value of Q III 1 that maximizes seller 1's total revenue. A method by exhaustive search could be: 1) for each possible value of Q III 1 , search all possible Nash equilibria, find the max-min Nash equilibrium, and calculate the revenue that seller 1 can earn during its leasing period with the max-min Nash equilibrium; 2) for different Q III 1 , compare the revenue values that seller 1 can earn during its leasing period, and select the optimal Q III 1 that makes seller 1 earn the most revenue. However, the complexity of the exhaustive search method is huge, due to the infinite number of values of Q III 1 ∈ [0, Q 1 ]. Thus, we target at an approximation method to select Q III 1 . When Q III 1 = x, U (Q 1 − x) and V (x) given in (8) are the revenue of seller 1 in Epoch II and Epoch III, respectively.
To select x (i.e., Q III 1 ), we need to evaluate how V (x) and U (Q 1 − x) change when x varies.
Lemma 1: The function V (x) is an increasing and concave function with x.
Proof: The proof follows a similar procedure to [25, proof of Lemma 6]. Now we evaluate function U (Q 1 − x) when x varies. To evaluate U (Q 1 − x) for a specific decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 }, we need to know d n,1 and d n,2 (n ∈ N II ) in the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the decomposition. Therefore, next we show how d n,1 and d n,2 change when x varies.
Consider a decomposition {Z 1 , Then the following lemmas can be expected. Lemma 2: For seller 1, d † n,1 ≤ d ‡ n,1 for n ∈ Z 2 , and d † n,1 = d ‡ n,1 = 0 for n ∈ Z 3 Z 4 . Proof: By the definitions of set Z 3 and Z 4 , seller 1 does not offer spectrum bandwidth to be leased in stages in Z 3 and Z 4 , and thus, d † n,1 = d ‡ n,1 = 0 for n ∈ Z 3 Z 4 . From (23), (25) , and the fact that Z 1 ∪ Z 2 = ∅, we have A 11 > A 21 ≥ 0. From (24) , (26) , and the fact that
For n ∈ Z 2 , with the aid of (29) and (27) , we have
in which the inequality comes from the fact that A 22 ≥ 0, Q † ≤ Q ‡ , and (A 11 A 22 − A 21 A 12 ) > 0. This completes the proof. Lemma 3: For seller 2, d † n,2 ≤ d ‡ n,2 for n ∈ Z 3 , and d † n,2 = d ‡ n,2 = 0 for n ∈ Z 2 Z 4 .
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof for Lemma 2, and thus, is omitted here.
is an interval, then when the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the decomposition is followed by the two sellers in Epoch II, seller 1's revenue U (Q 1 − x) in Epoch II can be written as G(x) and H(x) are monotonically increasing functions with respect to x ∈ I.
Proof: Suppose the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the decomposition
where (a) holds since d n,1 = 0 for n ∈ Z 3 Z 4 and d n,2 = 0 for n ∈ Z 2 , and (b) can be obtained by substituting d n,1 and d n,2 according to (29) and (30). As the decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 } is feasible, λ and ζ are non-negative. Additionally, from (27) and (28), it can be seen that λ and ζ are monotonically decreasing with Q II c 1 , i.e., (Q 1 − x) . So in the expression (32), both the term
are monotonically decreasing with Q II c 1 , and thus, are monotonically increasing with x (as Q II c 1 = Q 1 − x). It can be also checked that the term n ∈Z 2 (C 0 − C 1 d n,1 ) d n,1 n in (32) is a monotonically increasing function with respect to Q II c 1 (since the function (C 0 − C 1 y) y is monotonically increasing with y and d n,1 grows with Q II c 1 [from Lemma 2]), and thus, is a monotonically decreasing function with respect to x.
Define
and
It can be seen that H(x) , and both G(x) and H(x) monotonically increase with x. This completes the proof. In Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 3, it is assumed that
The next theorem will answer the following question: If a decomposition is feasible for a specific value of x, will it continue to be feasible if x increases or decreases?
. If x increases from x 0 , then there exists a point denoted x 1 ∈ [x 0 , Q 1 ] such that the decomposition is always feasible in interval [x 0 , x 1 ], and is always infeasible in interval (x 1 , Q 1 ]. If x decreases from x 0 , then there exists a point denoted x 2 ∈ [0, x 0 ] such that the decomposition is always feasible in interval [x 2 , x 0 ], and is always infeasible in interval [0, x 2 ).
Proof: Here we only prove the case when x increases, as the case when x decreases can be proved similarly.
For an x (i.e., Q III 1 ) value, the feasibility of decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 } is checked as follows: calculate λ and ζ based on (27) and (28), calculate d n,1 and d n,2 based on (29), (30), and the calculated λ and ζ values, and calculate μ n and ν n based on (18), (19) , and the calculated d n,1 , d n,2 , λ and ζ values. If all the values of λ, ζ, d n,1 , d n,2 , μ n , and ν n (n ∈ N II ) are non-negative, then the decomposition
Expressions (27) and (28) show that λ and ζ are linear functions of x (i.e., Q III 1 ). Expressions (29) and (30) show that d n,1 and d n,2 are linear functions of λ and ζ, and thus, are linear functions of x.
Expressions (18) and (19) show that μ n and ν n are linear functions of λ, ζ, d n,1 , and d n,2 , and thus, are linear functions of x.
Overall, λ, ζ, d n,1 , d n,2 , μ n , and ν n (n ∈ N II ) are all linear functions of x (i.e., Q III 1 ). When x = x 0 , as the decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 } is feasible, all the λ, ζ, d n,1 , d n,2 , μ n , and ν n (n ∈ N II ) are nonnegative. When x increases from x 0 , values of λ, ζ, d n,1 , d n,2 , μ n , and ν n linearly change accordingly. If at one point, say one of λ, ζ, d n,1 , d n,2 , μ n , and ν n decreases to value 0, then we can see that for x ∈ [x 0 , x 1 ], the decomposition Algorithm 1: Searching procedure for x (i.e., Q III 1 ). 1: Set x * = 0, and R * = 0. 2: Set x † = 0 3: For x = x † , find out all feasible Nash equilibria, and pick up the max-min Nash equilibrium and corresponding decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 }. 4: Find (using bisection search) a point denoted x 1 such that the decomposition picked in Step 3 is feasible for 
is an increasing function of x (from Lemma 1). Thus,
can be viewed as the difference of two monotonically increasing functions of
To maximize the difference of two monotonically increasing functions, a polyblock method can be used to find the global optimal solution (please refer to [26] - [28] for details). Denote the optimal point asx and the corresponding revenue U (Q 1 −x) + V (x) of seller 1 asR. 7: IfR > R * , then set x * =x and R * =R. 8: If x ‡ = Q 1 , then terminate the algorithm, and output x * . 9: Set x † = x ‡ , and proceed to Step 3. 4 } is always feasible, and for x ∈ (x 1 , Q 1 ], the decomposition is always infeasible. 8 This completes the proof. Remark: Theorem 4 shows that if a decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 } is feasible for x = x 0 , then there exists an interval of x containing x 0 such that the decomposition is feasible inside the interval, and infeasible outside the interval.
Based on Lemma 1, Theorem 3, and Theorem 4, we propose that seller 1 uses Algorithm 1 shown on the top of this page to select x (i.e., Q III 1 ). In the algorithm, x * denotes the optimal selection of seller 1 for x, and R * denotes the corresponding overall revenue of seller 1. For x = x † = 0, in Step 3 we first select the max-min Nash equilibrium and corresponding decomposition {Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 }. In Steps 4 and 5, we find the interval of x, denoted [x † , x ‡ ], such that the previously picked decomposition is feasible inside the interval and infeasible when x > x ‡ . In Step 6, we approximately consider that for x ∈ [x † , x ‡ ], both sellers always follow the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the decomposition picked in Step 3. Then for x ∈ [x † , x ‡ ], seller 1's revenue U (Q 1 − x) + V (x) can be shown as the difference of two monotonically increasing functions of x. A polyblock algorithm can be used to find the global optimal value of x ∈ [x † , x ‡ ], denotedx, such that the overall revenue of seller 1 is maximized. Then thex is a candidate for seller 1's selection of x (Step 7). Since interval [x † , x ‡ ] has been dealt with in Step 6, we proceed to the next interval starting from x ‡ in Step 9, to repeat the procedure and find other candidates for seller 1's selection of x. Among all the candidates, the one that has the maximal overall revenue of seller 1 is eventually selected by seller 1.
Overall, the strategies of the two sellers are as follows. In Epoch I, seller 2 derives its optimal strategy by solving Problem 1. At the beginning of Epoch II, seller 1 uses Algorithm 1 to find the value of x, denoted x * . Then in the non-cooperative game in Epoch II with Q III 1 = x * , both sellers follow the max-min Nash equilibrium. In Epoch III, seller 1 can derive its optimal strategy by solving Problem 4 with Q III 1 = x * .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS

A. Verification of the Analysis
We use numerical results by Matlab to verify the theoretical analysis in this paper. Since the spectrum leasing problem in Epoch I and Epoch III are both convex optimization problems, here we focus on Epoch II, and the number of stages in Epoch III is fixed as |N III | = 3. At the beginning of Epoch II, seller 1 has spectrum bandwidth with amount Q 1 = 100, while seller 2 has available spectrum bandwidth with amount Q II 2 = 60. Here the unit of Q 1 and Q II 2 is MHz, which can also be approximately transformed to sub-carriers if the system is based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM).
We take C 0 = 480 and C 1 = 1, which satisfies the requirement in (2) . Other configurations of C 0 and C 1 that satisfy the requirement in (2) can also be adopted.
1) Effectiveness of Theorem 2: In this subsection, the effectiveness of Theorem 2 in complexity reduction is verified. Table I lists the number of all possible decompositions and the number of decompositions that should be checked for feasibility with the aid of Theorem 2. It is clear that using Theorem 2 can significantly reduce the number of decompositions that should be checked.
2) Verification of Lemma 1: In this subsection, Lemma 1 is verified. Fig. 2 plots the function V (x) (the revenue of seller 1 in Epoch III) as x (i.e., Q III 1 ) grows from 0 to 100. From Fig. 2 , it can be seen that the function V (x) is an increasing and concave function with respect to x, which is consistent with Lemma 1. Note that the reference line in Fig. 2 is a straight line connecting points (0, V (0)) and (100, V (100)), which helps to observe the concavity of function V (x).
3) Verification of Lemmas 2 and 3: In this subsection, Lemmas 2 and 3 are verified. Consider N II = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Fig. 3  plots d n,1 and d n,2 versus the stage index n for a feasible decomposition in which Z 1 = {7, 8}, Z 2 = {6}, Z 3 = ∅, and Z 4 = {4, 5} when Q II c 1 is set to be 70, 80, and 90. Fig. 4 plots  d n,1 and d n,2 versus the stage index for a feasible decomposi- It can be seen that in all the cases, the number of iterations is 2 or 3, which shows that Algorithm 1 is efficient in reducing computation complexity.
2) Suboptimality of Algorithm 1: In Algorithm 1, to search optimal x (i.e., Q III 1 ), an approximation is used to reduce the computation complexity, as follows. For the non-cooperative game with x † , in Step 3 of Algorithm 1, we first find the maxmin Nash equilibrium and the corresponding decomposition Table II . Table II . We have tried a large number of scenarios with |N III | ∈ {13, 14, . . . , 30}, and have found that the associated noncooperative games in Epoch II all have unique Nash equilibrium, which means our Algorithm 1 is optimal in those considered scenarios. However, we find that it is hard to prove theoretically that Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II is unique or not unique when |N III | ≥ 13. This is an interesting problem, and we leave it for future investigation.
C. Comparison With a Cooperative Scheme
Now we compare with a cooperative scheme. The difference of the cooperative scheme from our proposed scheme is as follows. When the two sellers know the existence of each other (i.e., at the beginning of Epoch II), the two sellers cooperate to jointly maximize the total revenue of them over Epoch II and III, by solving the following optimization problem. max {d n , 1 |n ∈N 1 }, {d n , 2 |n ∈N II } n ∈N II (C 0 − C 1 (d n,1 + d n,2 )) d n,1 n + n ∈N III
For performance comparison, the simulation is set up as follows. Since the cooperative scheme and our proposed scheme perform the same in Epoch I, we set N I = ∅. And N II = {6, 5, 4, 3}, N III = {2, 1}. We fix the sum of Q 1 and Q 2 to be 200, and consider three configurations of (Q 1 , Q 2 ): (50, 150), (100, 100), and (150, 50). Fig. 7 shows the achieved revenue of the two sellers in our proposed scheme and the cooperative scheme. It can be seen that each seller's revenue in our proposed non-cooperative scheme is very close to that in the cooperative scheme, thus verifying the efficiency of our proposed scheme. 
D. Performance With Random Leasing Periods
We consider that each seller has alternating ON and OFF states. Here an ON and OFF state mean that the seller has and does not have spectrum to lease, respectively. When the state of the seller changes from OFF to ON, we call it an arrival, and when the state of the seller changes from ON to OFF, we call it a departure. Thus, for the seller, the duration from an arrival to the following departure is its leasing period. For seller i ∈ {1, 2}, the ON duration and OFF duration are exponential distributed with mean value being 1/μ i and 1/λ i , respectively. Here λ i and μ i are called the arrival and departure rate, respectively. The time duration of one stage is set as 1. We vary μ 1 , μ 2 , λ 1 , and λ 2 . For seller 1 and seller 2, when an ON state begins, the amount of available spectrum to lease is Q 1 = 100 and Q 2 = 60, respectively.
Following the random arrival and departure processes of the two sellers, we have a number of zero-seller, one-seller, and two-seller epochs.
r A zero-seller epoch means a number of consecutive stages in which neither seller has spectrum to lease. r A one-seller epoch means a number of consecutive stages in which only one seller has spectrum to lease. The seller can get its leasing strategy by solving an optimization problem similar to Problem 1 in Section III-A. r A two-seller epoch means a number of consecutive stages in which both sellers have spectrum to lease. If a twoseller epoch is followed by a one-seller epoch, the leasing strategy in the two-seller epoch and the following oneseller epoch can be obtained similar to our treatment for Epoch II and Epoch III in Section IV and V. If a twoseller epoch is followed by a zero-seller epoch, the leasing strategy in the two-seller epoch can be obtained similar to our treatment for our Epoch II in Section IV with Q III 1 = 0. Without loss of generality, the average revenue of seller 1 per leased stage (i.e., the total revenue of seller 1 divided by the number of total stages in which seller 1 has spectrum to lease) is plotted in Fig. 8 , for varying μ 1 , μ 2 , λ 1 , and λ 2 . We have the following observations. r When μ 1 increases, seller 1's average revenue decreases. This is because for a higher μ 1 , seller 1's leasing period has less duration. A shorter leasing period reduces the flexibility in seller 1's spectrum leasing, thus reducing seller 1's average revenue.
r When μ 2 increases, seller 1's average revenue increases. This is because higher μ 2 leads to shorter leasing period of seller 2, which means less competition of seller 2 to seller 1. Thus, seller 1's average revenue increases.
r When λ 1 increases, seller 1's average revenue almost keeps the same. The reason is as follows. When λ 1 increases, seller 1's average OFF state duration (expressed as 1/λ 1 ) decreases. However, when seller 1 is ON, its chance to overlap with seller 2's leasing period is not affected by seller 1's average OFF duration. In other words, seller 1's average OFF duration length does not affect the competition that seller 1 receives from seller 2 when seller 1 is ON. Thus, seller 1's average revenue almost keeps the same.
r When λ 2 increases, seller 1's average revenue decreases.
The reason is as follows. When λ 2 increases, seller 2's average OFF state duration (expressed as 1/λ 2 ) decreases. Thus, when seller 1 is ON, its chance to overlap with seller 2's leasing period is higher. In other words, seller 1 receives more competition from seller 2, and thus, its average revenue decreases.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate spectrum leasing with two sellers, in which seller 1 leases spectrum in Epoch II and Epoch III, and seller 2 leases spectrum in Epoch I and Epoch II, as shown in Fig. 1 . In Epoch I, only seller 2 has spectrum to lease, and its strategy is derived by solving a convex problem. In Epoch II, since the two sellers both have spectrum to lease, competition between the two sellers exists. Thus, the spectrum leasing in Epoch II is formulated as a non-cooperative game. Nash equilibria of the game are derived in closed form by jointly solving two optimization problems. By analyzing the choice of seller 1 for Epoch III, seller 1's strategy in Epochs II and III and seller 2's strategy in Epoch II are developed.
In this paper, we consider a duopoly market. When there are three or more sellers, similarly the union of their leasing periods can be divided into a number of epochs. For an epoch with one seller, the seller can derive its leasing strategy by solving a convex optimization problem similar to Problem 1 in this paper. For an epoch with two or more sellers, a game model can be set up, and all sellers follow the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the minimum unit-bandwidth revenue of the sellers. If a seller's leasing period also continues into subsequent epochs, the seller's leasing strategies over the multiple epochs can be derived jointly. In other words, similar to the method in Section V in this paper, the seller can use the amount of the spectrum reserved for later epochs as an input to the game model, and find the optimal amount of the reserved spectrum that maximizes its overall revenue.
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